/ hackuity VOC Vulnerability Operations Center

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### \* overview \*



## I. WHAT IS A VOC?

VOC

### Academic definition

A Vulnerability Operations Center (VOC) is a **centralized** facility or unit within an organization that is responsible for **identifying**, **assessing**, **managing**, and **mitigating** vulnerabilities in the organization's systems, networks, software, and infrastructure.

The VOC typically monitors **various sources for information** on security vulnerabilities, such as open-source intelligence, private advisories, security alerts, and research findings, and then coordinates efforts to address these vulnerabilities effectively.

Its primary goal is to **proactively** identify potential weaknesses and take necessary measures to prevent security breaches or mitigate their impact to ensure the overall security posture of the organization.

### ROC, VOC & SOC

GOVERNANCE: People & processPROACTIVE: Pre-attack risk reductionREACTIVE: Post-attack threat detection	tion
"Alignment & collaboration to manage risk & compliance" "Near real-time vulnerability intelligence, assessment & mgmt" "Near real-time detection & response"	
Risk Operations Center (ROC)       Vulnerability Operations Center (VOC)       Security Operations Center (Security Opera	OC)
Governance, Risk & Compliance Vulnerability Centralization, Risk-Based Prioritization & Remediation	se
Indicators of Compliance Indicators of Exposure Indicators of Compromise	
AUDIT & SECURITY POLICIES VULNERABILITIES & ASSETS EVENTS & LOGS	
Image: Data Center     Image: DataCenter     Image: Data Center     Image: Data Ce	

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	API				SOAR	
Risk Operations Center (ROC)	VOC-to-ROC process: Sending up-to-date information on asset and vulnerability status, enabling the ROC to approach real-time		Vulnerability Operations Center (VOC)	VOC-to-SO the organiza transform a incident rec	C process: Based on ation's security rules, vulnerability into an quiring an immediate	Security Operations Center (SOC)
	and not just be ba	sed on		read	ctive process	
	declarative inform	nation				
Ţ			Ţ			Ţ
		VULNI	ERABILITY SCAN	NNERS		SIEM
				S	OAR	
			ITSM			
				EDR	, NDR, XDR	
		F	REPORTING TO	OL		

Why SOC is not the right organization to manage Vulnerabilities?

- Too much events/information to manage
- When you're dealing with incidents, prevention and vulnerability management take a back seat
- The consequence is that because of the SOC's overload, vulnerabilities are never managed
- We have tried, through a collective mistake, to have the SOC manage the vulnerabilities, and we all know the current situation... it doesn't work
- The right organization to manage vulnerabilities is VOC

# II. THE VOC FOUNDATION



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VOC brings flexibility

The VOC delivers strong competitive advantages to an organization and enables a coherent approach to risk:

- No need to depend on scan tools, you can easily change suppliers according to your needs, all without changing your processes or having to retrain your teams
- Streamlines M&A processes
- C-level people don't think in technical terms, they think of financial and business risks: speak the same language
- Sustain your investments in existing security tools and unleash the ROI of each tool
- Pilot risks, not vulnerabilities





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# **III. SSVC OVERVIEW**

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#### SSVC foundation

The SSVC methodology can enable organizations to distribute findings to each remediation pool.

Three elements should guide the creation of the SSVC decision tree:

**1. Processing capacity**, i.e. how many people can be mobilized on a regular basis to carry out corrective actions

**2. The organization's risk appetite**, i.e. whether or not the organization can take risks, and on what scale

**3. Regulations applying to the organization**, i.e. some organizations are subject to regulations that require a certain level of security, and the organization must provide adequate processing capacity or risk fines and deregistration



Source: https://certcc.github.io/SSVC/ssvc-calc/

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### **Remediation Pools**

At the end of the risk-based qualification cycle, each organization must decide in which remediation pool to place the evaluated finding. There are generally four defined possible pools:

The finding(s) is/are considered extremely dangerous and must be corrected within an extremely short timeframe. Usually, these are vulnerabilities that can be exploited and actively used by attackers – and more often than not, they are findings carried by assets exposed on the Internet and directly accessible by attackers.	<ul> <li>The finding(s) is/are considered dangerous, treatment cannot wait until the next scheduled patching period. However, immediate remediation is not required.</li> <li>The remediation must be planned between the risk assessment date and the next scheduled patching period.</li> <li>Planning will depend on the urgency of the treatment and the associated risk assessment but is generally between 2 weeks and 2 months from the date of risk assessment.</li> </ul>	A programmed remediation period exists in the organization. This is often a period of 2 - 3 days scheduled in advance once or twice a year. The scheduling of this period depends on the organization's activity and is generally scheduled during periods of lower activity. Example of a scheduled remediation period: December 20 & 21 + June 28 & 29 During this period, the business knows in advance that the systems will be patched, and that the service provided by these systems will potentially be	<ul> <li>This silo contains the least dangerous findings, very often non-exploitable vulnerabilities and/or vulnerabilities with a CVSS base score of less than 4.</li> <li>This stock of exemptions can be considered temporary, and the content of this stock can be regularly reevaluated, particularly if the Exploitability criteria have evolved over time.</li> <li>Recertification of this stock is an important activity, as certain vulnerabilities can be "forgotten" but used by attackers years after they first</li> </ul>



### **CERT-IST Example**



## IV. SSVC tree examples

#### SSVC TREE EXAMPLES

SSVC-like process: example #1 - Organization with high remediation capacity



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And 🗸	Finding - Deactivated	is		False True		Ū
And	Finding - TRS v2 score	In	· <b>~</b>	Critical 🗙		Ū
And	Finding - Exploitable	is		False True		Ū
And	Asset (TRS Metrics) - Exposure	In	· <b>~</b>	Internet 🗙 🗶		Ū
+ Rule	+ Group					

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And 🗸	Finding - TRS	S v2 score V In V Critical X	Ū
	And 🗸	Finding - Exploitable v is False True	Ū
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	+ Rule	+ Group	
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		+ Rule + Group	
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+ Rule	+ Group		

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+ Rule	+ Group	
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SSVC #1	I – DEFER 🔯 🙎				
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SSVC TREE EXAMPLES

SSVC-like process: example #2 - Organization with very limited remediation capabilities



SSVC TREE EXAMPLES

SSVC-like process: example #3 - Organization running an Internet business with a high dependency on resilient cloud services



Evaluation du risque & Priorisation des efforts

### V. TICKETING STRATEGY

### Define your prioritisation strategy

You need to define which attributes and attribute values you want to use in your definition of the four remediation pools, and your choices depend mainly on this:

- Your compliance constraints
- Your security objectives
- Your remediation capability
- Your ITSM organization (how ticketing projects are organized, by OS team, by BU, etc.)

2 Create a query by remediation pool and by team/project on the ITSM side + link your queries with Remediation Groups

You need to create a query that considers all the branches of the SSVC tree leading to the same Remediation Pool - in addition, if several teams are set up on the ITSM side, you need to create a subquery for each of the separate remediation teams on the ITSM side.

In short, if you have three different ITSM teams dealing with a given Remediation Pool, you will have three queries.

### Define and apply rules for monitoring ticket processing and remediation pools

You need to write consistent rules that define how the various tickets are tracked and how you monitor the actions taken. It's a good idea to use 2 or 3 KPIs that are easy to understand, but that will give you a clear picture of your organization's efficiency.

#### **TICKETING STRATEGY**

### Overview – Example with the IMMEDIATE remediation pool for the 'Windows ITSM Team'



Detailed strategy considering ITSM organization: following example is for IMMEDIATE remediation pool & three different ITSM teams

### IMMEDIATE



For each Remediation Pool (in this example with IMMEDIATE), each team will receive a different ticket. Depending on the Remediation Pool and the organization's internal strategy, these tickets will be created once a day, once a week, etc. In this example, IMMEDIATE, the recommendation is to open a different ticket every day, with a Target Date of "Day+3".



Windows ITSM project

Ticket R28287



UNIX ITSM project







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Automatisation des tâches & Ticketing

## VI. THE VOC MATURITY



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Mandatory	Optional
Connect all vulnerability data sources	Automated patching
Data deduplication	Automated virtual patching
Bidirectional ITSM connection	Advanced automated scenarios with SOAR
Automated prioritization	Transform Finding into Incident (SOC relay)
Automated findings lifecycle	Advanced Vulnerability Intelligence

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### VOC Maturity steps

CHAOS	COMMITTED	PROACTIVE	INTEGRATED & ALIGNED	STRATEGIC BUSINESS PARTNER
	<section-header><text><text><text><text><text></text></text></text></text></text></section-header>	<text><text><text><text></text></text></text></text>	<section-header><text><text><text><text></text></text></text></text></section-header>	<text></text>
Missio	n is achievable by most o	Significant effort to	reach these stages	

**TAKEAWAYS** 

### VOC ≠ SOC

- Dans l'équilibre prévention/détection, attention à ne pas tout miser sur la détection
- Le VOC sera l'un des « big thing » de l'année 2025

#### THE VOC MATURITY

### TAKEAWAYS

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### Thank you

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